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OPINION 
_________________
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Petitioner Paul David Crews, who
faces a death sentence for a double-
murder, appeals the dismissal without
prejudice of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.  Crews concedes that the
petition is a mixed petition (i.e., it contains
both exhausted and unexhausted claims),
so that the District Court lacks the power
to grant relief under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1).  However, he argues that,
instead of dismissing the petition without
prejudice, the District Court should hold it
in abeyance while he attempts to exhaust
his unexhausted claims in state court.  He
contends that dismissing the petition
2without prejudice has created the
possibility that he will be time-barred
under AEDPA from returning to federal
court after his attempt to exhaust his
unexhausted claims, even though his initial
habeas petition was timely under AEDPA.
We agree with Crews and will reverse the
District Court’s dismissal of the petition
and remand it to the District Court.  
I.  Facts and Procedural History
The following facts, which are not
in dispute, are drawn from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395
(Pa. 1994).  
On September 13, 1990, two hikers,
Geoffrey Hood and Molly LaRue, were
killed at an overnight shelter on the
Appalachian Trail in Perry County,
Pennsylvania.  LaRue was bound, raped,
and stabbed.  She died approximately
fifteen minutes after receiving a knife
wound to the neck.  Hood, her boyfriend,
died five to eight minutes after being shot
three times with a revolver.  A week after
the killings, Crews was arrested.
At trial, witnesses testified that two
days before the murders, Crews visited a
library in East Berlin, Pennsylvania,
seeking a map of the Appalachian Trail.
Closer to the trail, Crews asked other
hikers for directions to the trail.  Other
witnesses observed him heading south on
the trail after the killings, wearing gear
that belonged to the victims.  When
arrested, Crews possessed numerous
personal articles that belonged to the
victims.  The police also found in Crews’
possession, a handgun, which a ballistics
expert testified was the handgun that killed
Hood, and a knife with blood on it.  The
blood on the knife matched LaRue’s blood
type.  Other witnesses identified objects
found at the murder scene and along the
trail south of the murder scene as
belonging to, or resembling property
owned by, Crews.  
FBI DNA expert Dr. Deadman
testified that Crews’ DNA patterns
matched the DNA patterns of semen
samples obtained from LaRue’s vagina in
three of four genetic loci.  He did not
testify as to the statistical probability that
such a match could occur by chance.
Crews’ expert, Dr. Acton, criticized any
conclusion reached without a statement of
the probability that the match occurred by
chance.  The jury found Crews guilty on
two counts of first degree murder, and the
trial proceeded to the capital sentencing
phase.
During the capital sentencing phase,
a physician for the prosecution testified
that LaRue’s hands had been tied before
she was killed.  Crews presented evidence
that he had no prior convictions.  He also
presented his employer, who testified
about Crews’ work experience and
drinking habits.  Finally, he presented a
psychiatrist, who testified that Crews had
a schizoid personality and suffered from
an organic  aggressive syndrome
aggravated on the day of the killings by
alcohol and cocaine.   
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The trial judge instructed the jury
t h a t  t he  po t en t i a l  ag g rav a t i n g
circumstances pertaining to Hood’s murder
were that the killing occurred during the
perpetration of a robbery, there was a
grave risk of death to another, and Crews
was convicted of another murder.  In the
LaRue  murde r ,  the  aggr avatin g
circumstances submitted to the jury were
that the killing occurred during the
perpetration of a rape, the killing was
committed by torture, and Crews was
convicted of another murder.  The
mitigating circumstances submitted to the
jury regarding both killings were that
Crews did not have any prior convictions,
he was under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, his capacity to appreciate or
conform his conduct was substantially
impaired, he acted under extreme duress,
and any other mitigating evidence
concerning petitioner’s character and
record or the circumstances of his offense
that the jury considered relevant.
The jury found two aggravating
circumstances in the Hood murder (grave
risk of death to another and conviction of
another murder) and all three aggravating
circumstances in the LaRue murder.  In
both murders, the jury found that
aggravating circumstances outweighed any
mitigating ones and returned verdicts of
death.  The court immediately sentenced
petitioner to two consecutive death
sentences.
Following his conviction and
sentence, Crews appealed.  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction on April 21, 1994.  Crews, 640
A.2d at 395.  Crews’ motion for
reargument was denied on May 31, 1994,
and he did not petition the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.  
On January 13, 1997, Crews filed
his first petition for relief under the
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541,
et seq.  The Court of Common Pleas
dismissed the p etition, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on
August 20, 1998.  Commonwealth v.
Crews, 717 A.2d 487 (Pa. 1998).  Crews
did not seek reargument in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court or petition
the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari.
On September 2, 1998, Crews filed
a document entitled “Motion for a Stay of
Execution and Request for Appointment of
Counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 2251, 21
U.S.C. § 848(q), and McFarland v. Scott
and request for in Forma Pauperis Status”
in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  On
September 24, 1998, the District Court
granted Crews in forma pauperis status,
appointed counsel, denied Crews’ motion
for a stay of execution based on the
Commonwealth’s representation that a
death warrant would not issue, and ordered
Crews to file a habeas petition by March
15, 1999.  In compliance with this order,
Crews filed a habeas petition on March 15,
1999.  On November 17, 1999, the District
Court determined that the habeas petition
4was a mixed petition, dismissed it without
prejudice to allow exhaustion, and denied
a Certificate of Appealability.  Crews
appealed the dismissal, and we granted a
Certificate of Appealability on April 25,
2002. 
On February 18, 1999, while his
habeas corpus petition was pending before
the District Court, Crews filed a second
PCRA petition in the Court of Common
Pleas, raising the unexhausted claims.  On
August 28, 2002, the Court of Common
Pleas granted the Commonwealth’s motion
to dismiss the second PCRA petition as
untimely.  That ruling is currently on
appeal.        
II.  Jurisdiction and Standards of
Review
The District Court had jurisdiction
over this habeas corpus petition pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
2253.  We exercise plenary review over
statute of limitations issues.  See Nara v.
Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2001).
Whether a district court has the power to
stay a habeas petition is a question of law,
and thus review is plenary.  See United
States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 844 (3d
Cir. 1992).  While we have not addressed
the standard of review for a district court’s
decision to dismiss a mixed petition rather
than to grant a stay, as we discuss below,
we now adopt an abuse of discretion
standard.  However, for the reasons we
state below, in view of the time limitations
imposed by the AEDPA, where outright
dismissal “could jeopardize the timeliness
of a collateral attack,” a district court
would abuse that discretion if it were not
to offer to the petitioner the opportunity of
staying, rather than dismissing, the
petition.  See Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d
374, 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1015 (2001). 
III.  Discussion
AEDPA requires a state prisoner to
file a petition for federal habeas corpus
relief within one year of the occurrence of
several events, the only event relevant to
this appeal being “the date on which the
judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review.”  28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d).  The purpose of this
requirement is to further the interest in
finality of state court judgments by
ensuring rapid federal review of
constitutional challenges.  See Woodford v.
Garceau, 123 S.Ct. 1398 (2003); Duncan
v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001).
Since Crews’ conviction became final
prior to April 24, 1996, the effective date
of AEDPA, he had a one-year grace
period, until April 23, 1997, to file his
habeas corpus petitions.  See Nara v.
Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 2001).
Under AEDPA’s statutory tolling
provision, the limitations period is tolled
for “the time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending . .
..”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).  It is
5undisputed that Crews qualifies for
statutory tolling for the period from
January 13, 1997, to August 20, 1998,
because his properly filed first PCRA
Petition was pending during this period.1
Since 264 days of Crews’ limitations
period passed prior to the filing of his first
PCRA petition, he had 101 days following
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial
of his first PCRA petition, or until
November 30, 1998, to file his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.  He satisfied this
deadline by filing his September 2, 1998,
application, in response to which the
District Court granted him an extension
until March 15, 1999, to file his habeas
corpus petition.2  He filed his habeas
corpus petition on March 15, 1999.  Thus,
his habeas corpus petition was timely.
The petition, however, is a mixed
one.  Under AEDPA, subject to certain
exceptions, “[a]n application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that – (A) the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State . . ..”  28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1).  This exhaustion rule promotes
“comity in that it would be unseemly in
our dual system of government for a
federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the
    1Crews did not move for reconsideration
of the denial of his first PCRA petition in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or
petition the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari.  Therefore, there is
no issue as to whether AEDPA’s
limitations period should be statutorily
tolled for the period during which a motion
for reconsideration and/or a petition for
certiorari was actually pending.  See Nara,
264 F.3d at 319 (suggesting that AEDPA’s
limitations period is statutorily tolled for
the time during which a petitioner actually
seeks reconsideration and/or certiorari).
Under Nara, an application for state post-
conviction relief is not pending, and thus
AEDPA’s limitations period is not
statutorily tolled, for the time during which
a petitioner could have sought, but did not
actually seek, reconsideration or certiorari.
See id. at 318-19.  Thus, the first PCRA
petition statutorily tolled the limitations
period only until August 20, 1998.
    2In the District Court, the
Commonwealth did not object to the
court’s granting of an extension of time to
file the petition or argue that the petition is
untimely because it was filed within the
court’s deadline, but after AEDPA’s
deadline.  In its response to Crews’ appeal,
th e  Co mm onw ea l th ,  w h i l e  n ot
“condoning” this procedure, does not
argue that the first petition for habeas
corpus was untimely.  In any event, the
Commonwealth waived the affirmative
defense that the first petition was untimely
under AEDPA because it did not plead this
defense in the answer or raise it at the
earliest practicable moment thereafter.  See
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134,
137 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied 124 S.Ct.
48 (2003)
6state courts to correct a constitutional
violation.”  Walker, 533 U.S. at 179.
Since the petition contains unexhausted
claims, the District Court dismissed it
without prejud ice to re file after
exhaustion, concluding that Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509 (1982), compelled dismissal.
In Lundy, the Supreme Court held
that “because a total exhaustion rule
promotes comi ty and  does not
unreasonably impair the prisoner’s right to
relief, we hold that a district court must
dismiss habeas petitions containing both
unexhausted and exhausted claims.”  455
U.S. at 522.  However, in relying on
Lundy, the District Court did not fully
appreciate that AEDPA, which was
enacted after Lundy, “has altered the
context in which the choice of mechanisms
for handling mixed petitions is to be
made.”  Zarvela, 254 F.3d at 379.  By
introducing a time limit, AEDPA calls into
doubt the conclusion in Lundy that
dismissal of a mixed petition does not
“unreasonably impair the prisoner’s right
to relief,” Lundy, 455 U.S. at 509, because
in situations such as the present one,
AEDPA’s limitations period may act to
deprive a petitioner of a federal forum if
dismissal of the habeas petition is required.
 See Zarvela, 254 F.3d at 379.  
Since Crews’ limitations period
expired on November 30, 1998, he will be
time-barred from returning to federal court
if his petition is dismissed unless he can
demonstrate that he is entitled to equitable
or statutory tolling.  It is not clear,
however, that Crews will be able to
establish an entitlement to statutory or
equitable tolling for the time during which
his first federal habeas and second state
PCRA petitions were pending.  See Carey
v. Saffold , 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002);
Walker, 533 U.S. at 180-83, 192; Artuz v.
Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-10 (2000); Merritt
v. Blaine, No. 01-2455 (3d Cir. 2003);
Nara, 264 F.3d at 315-16; Fahy v. Horn,
240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 944 (2001); Banks v. Horn, 271
F.3d 527, 534-35 (3d Cir. 2001), rev’d on
other grounds, 536 U.S. 266 (2002).3 
Staying a habeas petition pending
exhaustion of state remedies is a
permissible and effective way to avoid
barring from federal court a petitioner who
timely files a mixed petition.  In Walker,
four Justices indicated that district courts
should stay mixed petitions where there is
a danger that dismissal will deny a
petitioner federal review.  In a concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Souter, stated that:
although the Court’s pre-
AEDPA decision in Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982),
prescribed the dismissal of
    3Crews also suggests that he might be
entitled to equitable tolling for the time
prior to the filing of his first PCRA
petition because he was incompetent to file
a petition by himself.  The parties agree
that it is premature to resolve this issue.  It
is sufficient to note that this is another
ground Crews may raise when he seeks to
return to federal court.   
7federa l habeas corpus
p e t i t i o n s  c o n t a i n i n g
unexhausted claims, in our
post-AEDPA world there is
no reason why a district
court should not retain
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  a
meritorious claim and stay
further proceedings pending
the complete exhaustion of
state remedies.  Indeed,
there is every reason to do
so when AEDPA gives a
district court the alternative
of simply denying a petition
containing unexhausted but
nonmeritorious claims, see
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)
(1994 ed., Supp. V), and
when the failure to retain
jurisdiction would foreclose
fede ra l revie w  o f  a
meritorious claim because
of the lapse of AEDPA’s 1-
year limitations period.   
533 U.S. at 182-83 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).  Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg, in dissent, agreed with Justice
Stevens that federal courts should hold
mixed petitions in abeyance under such
circumstances.  See id. at 192 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).  The Walker majority did not
reject this conclusion; it did not reach the
issue.  See id. at 181.  
Virtually every other Circuit that
has considered the issue has held that,
following AEDPA, while it usually is
within a district court’s discretion to
determine whether to stay or dismiss a
mixed petition, staying the petition is the
only appropriate course of action where an
outright dismissal “ ‘could jeopardize the
timeliness of a collateral attack.’ ”
Zarvela, 254 F.3d at 380 (quoting
Freeman v. Page, 208 F.3d 572, 577 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 946 (2000));
see also Neverson v. Bissonnette, 261 F.3d
120, 126 n. 3 (1st Cir. 2001); Mackall v.
Angelone, 131 F.3d 442, 445 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1100 (1998);
Brewer v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 491, 493 (5th
Cir. 1998); Palmer v. Carlton, 276 F.3d
777, 781 (6th Cir. 2002); Kelly v. Small,
315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that there is a “growing consensus”
that the Zarvela approach is proper).  The
only Circuit to come out the other way is
the Eighth Circuit.  See Carmichael v.
White, 163 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir.
1998).  However, Carmichael relies on
pre-AEDPA precedent and does not
address the timeliness problems created by
AEDPA.  See id. (citing Victor v. Hopkins,
90 F.3d 276, 279-80 (8th Cir. 1996).  
 
In Zarvela, the court recognized
that the purpose of AEDPA’s limitations
period is to further the goal of finality by
avoiding endless delay in deciding
constitutional challenges to a conviction,
particularly in capital cases.  See id.
However, the Zarvela court found that “the
concern about excessive delays in seeking
exhaustion and in returning to federal
court after exhaustion can easily be
dispelled by allowing a habeas petitioner
no more than reasonable intervals of time
to present his claims to the state courts and
8to return to federal court after exhaustion.”
Id. at 381.  The Zarvela court concluded
that a reasonable interval normally is 30
days.  See id.
The Commonwealth argues that
controlling precedent in this Circuit,
namely Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201 (3d
Cir. 1997), is contrary to the Zarvela line
of cases.  In Christy, we held that a district
court erred in staying a mixed petition
instead of dismissing the petition without
prejudice because there was no substantial
danger that the proffered potential harm
would occur.  See id. at 207.  The potential
harm in Christy was execution, see id.,
while the potential harm in the present
case is being barred by time limitations
from returning to federal court.  Even
assuming that Christy is applicable in
cases involving other types of potential
d a n g e r s ,  C h r i s t y  i s  f a c t u a l l y
distinguishable from the present case.  In
Christy, a death warrant had not been
issued and the General Counsel to the
Governor of Pennsylvania assured the
Christy Court via letter that Christy would
not be executed during the pendency of his
state court proceedings.  Thus, there was
no substantial danger of execution.  See id.
at 207.   
However, as discussed above, in the
present case, there is a substantial danger
that Crews will be time-barred from
returning to federal court because his
petition will be filed after the expiration of
the limitations period and it is not clear
that he will be entitled to tolling.  Christy
suggests that, under such circumstances
where there is a substantial danger that the
proffered potential harm will occur, the
petition should be stayed, noting that “[i]f
a state court has refused to grant a stay
pending its adjudication of a prisoner’s
federal constitutional claims, such action
by the district court would be appropriate.”
Christy, 115 F.3d at 207.   
The Commonwealth also argues
that we should not follow Zarvela because
the tools of statutory and equitable tolling
are sufficient to ensure that Crews will not
be time-barred from returning to federal
court if he has acted with reasonable
diligence in bringing the claims.
However, where, as here, outright
dismissal could jeopardize the timeliness
of a habeas petition, there are two
advantages to staying a mixed petition,
rather than dismissing it and relying on
tolling to determine if a subsequent
petition is timely.  
First, a stay preserves judicial
resources.  While there is an additional
cost to district courts in terms of managing
their dockets, this cost is more than off-set
by the savings in the amount of time that
courts will have to spend analyzing
t ime l i ne s s i s sue s .   U nder  th e
Commonwealth’s proposed approach,
when a district court decides whether to
dismiss a mixed petition, it must determine
the likelihood that a petitioner will be able
to exhaust his unexhausted claims in state
court.  This determination is easier now
that the Pennsylvania courts have ruled
that relaxed waiver is no longer available,
but there is still the issue whether a
9petitioner may be able to qualify for one of
the exceptions to PCRA’s time-limit.  See
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545; Albrecht, 720 A.2d at
693.  Further, under the Commonwealth’s
proposed approach, a court will have to
engage in the fact-intensive analysis of
whether a petitioner acted with reasonable
diligence when the petitioner seeks to
return to federal court.  On the other hand,
under the Zarvela approach, when a
petitioner seeks to return to federal court,
the initial timeliness of the habeas petition
will have already been determined.  
The second advantage of staying a
mixed petition is that a petitioner knows
before he chooses to attempt to exhaust his
unexhausted claims in state court that he
will still have a federal forum to review his
exhausted claims, so long as he acts
diligently in seeking state review of the
unexhaus ted issues.4  Under the
Commonwealth’s proposed approach,
however, a petitioner must guess whether
he will benefit from attempting to exhaust
his unexhausted claims.  If the claims are
timely in state court, he can exhaust them.
If they are not timely, however, the
AEDPA limitations period may not be
tolled.  He then may be time-barred from
raising even his exhausted claims in
federal court unless he can demonstrate
that he is entitled to tolling.  If, however, a
petitioner does not attempt exhaustion, he
foregoes the possibility of raising his
unexhausted claims.  See Lundy, 455 U.S.
at 510, 520.  It is not always easy, even for
experienced practitioners, to determine
where a claim will fall in this mix.
The Commonwealth argues that
AEDPA requires a petitioner like Crews to
make a strategic decision:  he must either
abandon his unexhausted claims or else
return to state court to attempt to exhaust
them at some risk of losing the opportunity
for federal review entirely.  However,
nothing in AEDPA prohibits a district
court from avoiding this dilemma by
staying a timely mixed petition pending
diligent exhaustion of unexhausted claims.
AEDPA requires only that a petition be
filed in federal district court before the end
of the limitations period, 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d), and not be granted until all
claims contained in the petition have been
exhausted at the state level, 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1).   Thus, a habeas petition may
be filed but not granted prior to total
exhaustion of state remedies, and a stay
pending exhaustion is perfectly consistent
with these rules.
The Court in Lundy required
dismissal of mixed petitions to ensure that
a district court would not grant relief on
unexhausted claims.  The Court explained
that “one court should defer action on
    4As noted in Zarvela, in order to avoid
unnecessary delay by the petitioner in
pursuing the unexhausted claims in state
court, the district court “should condition
the stay on the petitioner’s initiation of
exhaustion within a limited period,
normally 30 days, and a return to the
district court after exhaustion is
completed, also within a limited period,
normally 30 days.”  254 F.3d at 381. 
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causes properly within its jurisdiction until
the courts of another sovereignty with
concurrent powers, and already cognizant
of litigation, have had the opportunity to
pass upon the matter.”  Lundy, 455 U.S. at
518.  However, a stay achieves this goal as
effectively as a dismissal, because a stay is
“a traditional way to ‘defer’ to another
court ‘until’ that court has had an
opportunity to exercise its jurisdiction over
a habeas petition’s unexhausted claims.”
Zarvela, 254 F.3d at 380.   
We will, therefore, follow Zarvela.
We hold that district courts have the
discretion to stay mixed habeas corpus
petitions but that, as in this case, when an
outright dismissal could jeopardize the
timeliness of a collateral attack, a stay is
the only appropriate course of action.5  See
254 F.3d at 380.   If a habeas petition is
stayed, the petitioner should be given a
reasonable interval, normally 30 days, to
file his application for state post-
conviction relief, and another reasonable
interval after the denial of that relief to
return to federal court.  See id.  If a
petitioner fails to meet either time-limit,
the stay should be vacated nunc pro tunc.
See id.
 We note that while these two
“reasonable intervals” may appear to
enlarge the one-year limitations period for
some petitioners, technically these
intervals are only available after a petition
has been timely filed.  See id. at 382.
Further, we agree with the court in Zarvela
that 
such brief additional time is
consistent with the purpose
of AEDPA’s limitation
period, which was to make
sure that a state prisoner
does not take more than one
year after his conviction
becomes final to present his
federal claim .   State
prisoners should have the
full year allowed them by
Congress to consider and
prepare their federal habeas
    5We diverge from Zarvela in one
respect.  The court in Zarvela held that
only exhausted claims should be stayed,
and that unexhausted claims should be
dismissed, subject to reinstatement should
the petitioner successfully exhaust them.
See 254 F.3d at 380.  We hold that all of
the petitioner’s claims should be stayed,
and any claims that remain unexhausted
after the petitioner returns to federal court
should be dismissed at that juncture.  If the
unexhausted claims are dismissed initially
subject to reinstatement, the petitioner
might use the re-submission as an
opportunity to amend his petition to add
new claims beyond the one-year filing
period.  See United States v. Thomas, 221
F.3d 430, 436-37 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding
that a petitioner cannot amend a petition
after AEDPA’s statute of limitations has
run to add an entirely new claim).  Our
modification of the Zarvela rule will
conserve judicial resources by avoiding
litigation over this issue.
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petitions, and, if it turns out
that the presence of
unexhausted claims and the
requirements of federal law
require a round trip to and
f r o m  s ta te  co ur t  t o
accomplish exhaustion, brief
intervals to meet such
requirements should not be
counted against that one-
year period.  Prompt action
by the petitioner to initiate
exhaustion and return to
federal court after its
completion serves as the
functional equivalent of the
“reasonable diligence” that
has long been a prerequisite
to equitable tolling of
limitations periods. 
Id., 254 F.3d. at 382 (emphasis added); see
also Walker, 533 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (holding that it is reasonable
to believe “that Congress could not have
intended to bar federal habeas review for
petitioners who invoked the court’s
jurisdiction within the 1-year interval
prescribed by AEDPA.”
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the
District Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s
habeas corpus petition is reversed, and this
case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
